
























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
Intra-Household Time Allocation:
Gender Differences in Caring for Children




Victor M. Montuenga 
Intra-Household Time Allocation: 




University of Zaragoza  
 
José Alberto Molina 
University of Zaragoza 
and IZA 
 
Victor M. Montuenga 












P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 










Intra-Household Time Allocation: 
Gender Differences in Caring for Children 
 
This paper analyses the intra-household allocation of time to show gender differences in 
childcare. In the framework of a general efficiency approach, hours spent on childcare by 
each parent are regressed against individual and household characteristics, for five samples 
(Denmark, France, Germany, Italy and Spain), with data being drawn from the European 
Community Household Panel-ECHP (1994-2001). Empirical results show a clear inequality in 
childcare between fathers and mothers, with this being more evident in Mediterranean 
countries. Panel data estimates reveal that, in general, caring tasks are mainly influenced by 
the presence of young children in the household, by the total non-labor income, and by the 
ratio of mothers’ non-labor income to family’s non-labor income, with this latter variable 
exhibiting a different behavior across genders and across countries. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
Despite the trend towards an egalitarian sharing of the caring tasks between parents 
within a household, important gender differences persist. For example, the number of 
hours per week (h/w) that mothers dedicate to caring for family members is 
considerably higher than that of fathers. International data from the European 
Community Household Panel, ECHP (1994-2001) reveals in Table 1 that the average 
number of hours fathers dedicate to caring for children varies markedly between 
Southern and Northern European countries (7.45 h/w and 7.97 h/w for Spain and Italy, 
respectively, against 19.38 h/w for Denmark), while the hours for mothers, always 
higher, do not show this great variation (30.14 h/w for Italy and 37.63 h/w for France).  
In order to explain intra-household allocation of available time among leisure, paid-
work outside the home and non-paid housework (including childcare), two main 
theoretical approximations can be followed, namely the efficiency approach and the 
game-theoretic approach. The efficiency approach stems from the traditional or unitary 
model, which assumes that a household acts as a single decision-making unit, 
maximizing its utility function subject to the budget constraint (Gary Becker, 1965). 
However, as emphasized by  Frederic Vermeulen (2002), some weaknesses of this 
model have led to a reinterpretation, called the collective model, which holds that a 
household consists of several individuals with their own rational preferences, in such a 
way that the intra-family decision process must lead to Pareto-efficient allocations 
(Pierre-Andre Chiappori, 1988, 1992, 1997).   
On the other hand, the game-theoretic approach, which takes into account several 
decision-makers in a household, also includes two models. The first is a non-co-
operative model, in such a way that the Nash equilibrium implies that family members 
maximise their utility, taking the other individuals’ behaviour as given (see, for 
example, Yoram Weiss and Robert Willis, 1985; Kai Konrad and Kjell Lommerud, 
1995). The second incorporates elements of co-operative game theory in a household 
model, specifically that of axiomatic bargaining theory, in such a way that household 
members reach the Nash or the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions after trying to agree on 
how to divide the gains of co-operation (see Marilyn Manser and Murray Brown, 1980; 
Marjorie McElroy and Mary Horney, 1981).  
In recent years, two factors have led to a growing interest in the determinants of 
childcare  separate from other time uses. First, the existence of relevant gender 
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second, the perception that there is no good market substitute for such activity, the most 
time-consuming task in the home. In this article, we use the efficiency approach to 
model intra-household time allocation in order to show European gender differences in 
caring for children. This general approach has several characteristics. First, it allows for 
the possibility of considering a common source of income, that is to say, the family 
income (see Hironori Kato and Manabu Matsumoto, 2008). Second, it accounts for the 
fact that the household consists of several members having different preferences, in 
such a way that a variable relating the labor income of the mother to that of the father is 
included, to more adequately capture the influence of bargaining power on intra-
household allocation of time. Finally, Pareto efficiency exists in the time allocation 
among the household members.  
(Table 1) 
Specifically, we analyze how socio-economic incentives determine parental 
allocation of time to childcare within the household, for five representative European 
countries, bearing in mind the following two conditions. First, despite the recent 
increase of women’s participation in the labor market (and in hours of work), there 
persist clear differences between mothers and fathers in the time worked in the market, 
and in the time allocated to childcare, with this activity having the special characteristic 
that the caregivers are not paid by the market. Second, these differences are the result of 
a bargaining process within the household, in such a way that individual preferences are 
relevant, but the resulting allocation of time by each of the parents, to each activity, 
must be seen in a family context, where each parent’s income may be an important 
determinant of that allocation.  
We use the eight available waves of the ECHP (1994-2001) in order to estimate the 
hours dedicated by each parent to caring for children for five national samples 
(Denmark, France, Germany, Italy and Spain).  The structure of the Panel, which 
includes relevant information on the factors affecting the alternative uses of household 
time, allows us to control for the unobservable heterogeneity problem, as well as to 
eliminate the bias derived from aggregation. We simultaneously estimate the childcare 
hours of each parent for each country, focusing on couples where both parents work 
outside the home, and compare these results with those obtained from couples where 
only the father is employed, thus considering possible differential behaviours across 
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of time spent on childcare and in paid-work are jointly, endogenously, determined. The 
most interesting finding of the estimations lies in obtaining cross-country evidence on 
gender differences in the personal and family characteristics influencing decisions about 
the hours dedicated to childcare, with this evidence allowing us to make international 
comparisons of different welfare state regimes and social norms, for both genders. 
 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Economists argue that, in order to properly model the analysis of the intra-household 
allocation of time, an adequate theoretical framework is required. We follow here the 
efficiency approach, which, encompassing both the unitary and collective models, 
allows us to address the question of how the responsibilities of caring for children 
within the household are allocated. 
Although the consideration of household production in the study of the time-
allocation process dates back to Becker (1965), its inclusion in a general theoretical 
framework, in which households are considered to consist of different individuals with 
their own preferences, came later (Reuben Gronau, 1977). Even more recent is the 
consideration of childcare as an activity different from leisure and/or home production 
(David Ribar, 1995). Childcare shares with leisure its enjoyment, and the fact that it is 
time-consuming. Simultaneously, it requires much effort and is not remunerated, which 
makes it very similar to home production. What makes childcare quite different from 
leisure and home production is that it is difficult to substitute for it in the market. 
Empirical literature has found significant differences between these alternative uses of 
time, and the economic factors affecting them. The most recent evidence tends to show 
that childcare can be assimilated more to paid work than other non-paid activities (Jean 
Kimmel and Rachel Connelly 2007; Rachel Connelly and Jean Kimmel 2007).  
The determinants of time devoted to childcare that have been most commonly 
studied are related to the time involved in other activities, mainly, labor supply, to 
wages, to non-labor income and to individual and household characteristics. We briefly 
summarize some of the results. First, more hours of paid work are related to own lower 
hours of childcare and more hours by the spouse. This evidence, however, is somewhat 
more significant in the case of men (Keith Bryant and Cathleen Zick 1996; Daniel 
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O’Neill 2005; Connelly and Kimmel 2007). Thus, the increased participation of women 
in paid work has meant a reduction in their hours devoted to leisure and home 
production, but not in those devoted to childcare; whereas male workers, in contrast, 
have maintained their time in paid work and augmented the number of hours devoted to 
childcare and to housework (Liana Sayer, Suzanne Bianchi, and John Robinson 2004; 
Suzanne Bianchi and Sara Raley 2005; Korenman, Liao, and O’Neill 2005; John 
Sandberg and Sandra Hoffert 2005; Peter Howie, John Wicks, John M. Fitzgerald, 
Douglas Dalenberg, and Rachel Connelly 2006; Charlene Kalenkoski, David Ribar, and 
Leslie Stratton 2007).
1 This leads us to conclude that childcare activity has an important 
investment component, so that parents desire higher quality childcare for their children, 
which, in turn, requires more parental time. 
Second, in regards to earnings, differences in behavior have been found by gender. 
Thus, whereas higher wages of fathers are associated with more hours spent on 
childcare by mothers, the opposite is not true, so that an increase of mothers’ wages 
does not lead to more hours spent on childcare by fathers (Peter Kooreman and Ariel 
Kapteyn, 1987; Korenman, Liao, and O’Neill 2005). More differences are found in the 
influence of own wages on time spent on childcare. In European countries, the impact is 
negligible (Henriette Van den Brink and Wim Groot 1997, for the Netherlands; 
Hallberg and Klevmarken 2003, for Sweden; Charlene Kalenkoski, David Ribar, and 
Leslie Stratton 2009, for the UK), whereas in the US, higher wages imply more hours 
spent on childcare (Kimmel and Connelly, 2007 and Connelly and Kimmel, 2007).
2 One 
simple way to include, in a single variable, own and spouse’s earnings or wages, is to 
construct a measure expressing the earnings of one as a fraction of the other’s, or of 
total family income. This variable can be interpreted as an indicator of the bargaining 
power of one of the spouses as against the other. It has been found that a higher fraction 
of women’s income is associated with fewer hours spent on housework in Spain 
(Begoña Alvarez and Daniel Miles 2003), and in the US (Joni Hersch and Leslie 
Stratton 1994; Michael Bittman, Paula England, Liana Sayer, Nancy Folbre, and 
George Matheson 2003). In assessing its effect on childcare, the only study that has 
employed this kind of variable is Connelly and Kimmel (2007) for the US, who found 
that an increase in the relative wage of mothers leads to an increase in the share of 
childcare carried out by mothers.  
  5Some possible individual and family characteristics influencing the number of hours 
devoted to childcare include education, number and age of the children, age or cohort 
effects, and the availability of external child care. Among these, only the variables 
expressing the number of children and their age are found to be relevant since, on the 
one hand, education and age, both highly correlated with wages, are usually found to be 
non-significant and, on the other hand, the lack of reliable data makes the results 
derived from the inclusion of out-of-household childcare non-robust. Kalenkoski, Ribar, 
and Stratton (2007) focus on the differences in marital status across families, showing 
that there are no significant differences, for the US and the UK, between married and 
cohabitant couples. Finally, since differences between genders are in fact observed, 
some authors claim the existence of gender, and other specific related factors, which 
can be associated with different gender norms across countries (see for instance Bittman 
et al. 2003; Joost de Laat and Almudena Sevilla-Sanz 2006; Stephanie Seguino 2007), 
as well as unobservable effects, which can only be controlled for through the use of 
longitudinal data (Alvarez and Miles 2003). 
All these determinants are addressed in this work. Although we discuss this in depth 
later, we now advance several features. First, we include variables related to earnings, 
with a twofold aim: to represent specialization in the allocation of time (Gary Becker 
1991), and also bargaining power (Shelly Lundberg and Robert Pollack 1993). 
Additionally, these variables are included in such a way that the specification is 
compatible with both the unitary and the collective models of intra-household time 
allocation, within the more general efficiency approach. Second, the number of hours 
spent on paid work are explicitly included to take into account the interdependence 
between both uses of time. Unfortunately, the database used does not provide 
information about time devoted to both leisure and housework, so these activities are 
omitted from our analysis. Thus, our study is based on a reduced form specification,
3 
which is close in spirit to that used by Hersch and Stratton (1994) and Alvarez and 
Miles (2003), for explaining housework time, and Hallberg and Klevmarken (2003) and 
Kalenkoski, Ribar, and Stratton (2005, 2007) who study time allocated to childcare in 
Sweden and the UK and the US, respectively. Third, we have introduced a set of 
variables expressing the number of children living in the household by age group, and 
the occurrence of a birth in the year of the interview. Fourth, since our information is 
provided in panel data form, we can control for the unobservable heterogeneity that is 
  6assumed to be constant over time. Finally, in order to account for differences in gender 
norms, we have studied five EU countries using the same database.  
Focusing on this latter aspect of the analysis, these countries represent a great deal of 
variation within the EU, in regards to their welfare regime types and policies related to 
childcare and women’s participation in the labor market, as well as in social norms and 
stereotypes (Francesca Bettio and Janneke Plantenga 2004; Seguino 2007). The 
traditional literature in sociology (see e.g. Gosta Esping-Andersen 1990), typically 
considers three regime models: Anglo-Saxon, Continental European and Nordic 
European, associated, respectively, with liberal, conservative and social democratic 
countries. However, recent contributions by Rosanna Trifiletti (1999) and Wil Arts and 
John Gelissen (2002), among others, have suggested new typologies be added, with one 
being the so-called Mediterranean model.  
Bettio and Plantenga (2004), examining only care-giving tasks, and using data from 
the third wave of the ECHP, year 1996, group EU countries according to childcare 
provisions (both formal and informal) based on information from social childcare 
services, leave arrangements and financial provisions (see their Table 3). This grouping 
is close to the traditional literature mentioned above, and they find two extreme clusters, 
with several subgroups in between. The first cluster includes the Mediterranean 
countries (Spain, Italy and Greece), which seem to delegate all the management of 
childcare to the family. These countries are characterized by a high index of informal 
care, with formal childcare arrangements being quite underdeveloped (see also Trifiletti 
1999). At the other extreme, is the cluster of the Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden 
and Finland), which follow a universalist approach, with extensive formal childcare 
resources. The role of the family in providing care is substituted almost entirely by the 
state. Different subgroups of countries can be found in intermediate positions, with little 
differences among them. Thus, the Anglo-Saxon countries in the Esping-Andersen 
terminology (the UK and Ireland in Europe) have childcare outcomes very close to 
those of the Mediterranean, with the central continental countries (Germany, France, 
Belgium, etc) in between the Mediterranean and the Nordic countries. Thus, these 
central countries are characterized by fairly extended collective agreements, growing in 
number, through which private care is publicly facilitated, although it has not 
substituted for informal childcare.  
Accordingly, we include the following countries in our analysis. Denmark as 
  7representative of the social democratic Scandinavian countries, in which there exists 
generous maternity leave and extensive help in childbearing and childcare.
4 Two 
Central Continental countries (France and Germany), also with generous maternity 
leave, but less extensive help in childcare. And, finally, two Mediterranean countries 
(Italy and Spain) in which informal childcare, mainly provided within the family, is the 
rule. As a whole, the five sample countries cover an ample range of the variations 
observed within Europe. For more on these differences see Wendy Sigle-Rushton and 
Jane Waldfogel (2007) and Trifiletti (1999). 
 
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
Data used in this work, the eight waves of the ECHP (1994-2001), provide abundant 
information about both the personal and labour characteristics of individuals, with this 
information being homogenous across the five sample countries, given that the 
questionnaire is the same and the statistical analyses are coordinated by EUROSTAT.
5 
Recent studies (see, e.g., Hallberg and Klevmarken 2003; Korenman, Liao, and O’Neill 
2005; Kimmel and Connelly 2007; Connelly and Kimmel, 2007; Kato and Matsumoto 
2008) have benefited from the availability of Time Use Surveys, which allow the study 
of the allocation of time to different activities (leisure, paid work, housework, childcare, 
sleeping and so on) within a simultaneous framework. Furthermore, the record of time 
allocated by each interviewee is for a complete day, so that full information is available, 
subject to minimal recall measurement errors. However, previously used databases have 
several drawbacks, two of which are significant: the lack of longitudinal information, 
which prevents us from controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, and the lack of 
information on the intra-household allocation of time among family members, since full 
information on time allocation is only collected for a single individual. Our use of the 
ECHP permits us to overcome these two drawbacks. 
We have selected families with two parents and at least one child, in which the 
spouses are of working age, that is to say, between 25 and 64 years old, and constructed 
two samples. In the first, we include the families in which both parents work, whereas 
in the second we include those families in which only the father works. The use of both 
samples allows us to compare results between both types of family, with this strategy 
casting some light on the distinct behaviour between the different participation status of 
  8mothers. The dependent variable is the number of weekly hours dedicated to caring for 
children, considered for each parent (ChildCareFather, ChildCareMother). A number 
of socio-economic factors influence the total amount of time devoted to this activity. 
We begin by including several variables referring to the bargaining power within the 
household. Although there are some criticisms of the methodological individualism of 
bargaining models applied to intra-household time allocation (Bina Agarwal 1997), 
most recent studies include variables capturing the influence of bargaining power on the 
allocation of time. A standard measure of bargaining power is the ratio between 
women’s and men’s earnings, or between women’s and family earnings.
6 We have 
chosen an indicator of the fraction of mother’s non-labor income over the family’s non-
labor income, which is defined as Ratio, preferring this to a measure which expresses 
relative wages, for two reasons. First, because when analyzing couples where women do 
not work, we need an indicator of the bargaining power within that couple. Second, 
given that the inclusion of all variables indicating educational level and age 
approximates wages, all of these may be correlated (Kalenkoski, Ribar, and Stratton 
2009). The interpretation of Ratio is intuitive, the greater this variable, the greater the 
bargaining power that mothers possess.  
Nevertheless, this is not the only variable reflecting bargaining power. Other factors 
that may influence bargaining are related to individual wages, cohort effects or social 
norms. Following Kalenkoski, Ribar, and Stratton (2007) and Kimmel and Connelly 
(2007), wages are approximated by the educational level. Education is expressed as the 
highest level of studies completed. We have considered three levels: Educ1, primary 
level (basic education or less), that is the reference category; Educ2, secondary level 
(secondary education, Baccalaureate or vocational training); and Educ3, corresponding 
to university. Regarding cohort effects, the average age of the parents (AverageAge) is 
included in the estimation which, in addition to expressing the effect of the parents’ 
ages on childcare, can also be seen as an indicator of the attitude of the family to the 
division of family work, derived from the different traditional or modern roles of the 
parents. Finally, it has been shown that factors, such as social norms and stereotypes, 
may affect bargaining power (Jonsoong Kim and Lydia Zepeda 2004). The fact that we 
study several countries, with marked differences in welfare regimes and social norms, 
may be helpful in identifying, indirectly, their effect on time allocation. 
  9We also include three variables which refer to the presence of children in the 
household, and which may affect the time dedicated to caring. The first of these 
variables, Children<16, indicates the number of children under age 16 who live with 
the family, while the second, Children<12, is a dummy variable which indicates that 
there is a child under age 12 living with the family. The third, Birth, indicates whether 
there has been a birth in the family during the year of the interview.
7 As explained 
above, our specification is general, so as to incorporate features from both the unitary 
and the collective models. Therefore, in addition to the variable Ratio, and those 
expressing educational levels and age, which can approximate wage rates, we include 
the family non-labor income (FamilyIncome) as a separate regressor. It may be argued 
that higher family income will negatively influence the time spent on childcare, if this 
task can be easily hired in the market, but this is not empirically observed. By contrast, 
since childcare has an important investment component, previous evidence has shown 
that higher family income is associated with more hours spent on childcare. With 
respect to the hours of remunerated work of the parents (WorkedFather, 
WorkedMother), it is very likely that the greater the number of hours worked by the 
individual, the fewer hours of childcare activities, and the greater the number of hours 
required from the spouse, these effects being more evident in the case of fathers (Bryant 
and Zick 1996; Hallberg and Klevmarken 2003; Connelly and Kimmel 2007).  
Table 1 shows the average and the standard deviation of each of the variables used in 
the analysis for the unweighted pooled data. Note that considerations are given in turn, 
and with respect to each of the five countries in question, first to all the families, then to 
families in which both parents work and, finally, to families in which only the father 
works outside the home. Whereas the last row of this Table includes the number of 
observations, that is to say, the number of families, a detailed Table A1 in the Appendix 
displays these disaggregated per wave and per sub-sample.  
With respect to the dependent variable, caring for children, it is clearly observed in 
the five samples that mothers dedicate more hours than fathers to this activity, ranging 
from almost five times more in Spain to less than twice as much in Denmark. When 
distinguishing between the cases where both parents work, and where only the fathers 
work outside the home, all differences decrease in the first case, and increase in the 
second. Thus, when both parents work, differences in Spain and Italy decline to “only” 
three times more for mothers than for fathers, with Denmark again being the country 
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greatest difference is almost ten times in Spain, and the lowest again in Denmark, 
slightly more than twice as much. We can also note that mothers dedicate less time to 
caring for children when both parents work, as compared to the case where only the 
father works, with the opposite applying to the fathers. An outstanding feature is that 
time spent in childcare by fathers in Denmark is by far the highest, more than twice that 
of any other country, whereas differences in childcare across countries by mothers are 
much smaller. Thus, the majority of the differences across Northern, Central and 
Southern countries are basically observed in the amount of time devoted by fathers to 
childcare (see also Bettio and Plantenga, 2004 and de Laat and Sevilla-Sanz, 2006). 
In regards to the explanatory variables, we begin with the age variable, AverageAge. 
The average age is very similar across countries, ranging from 38 years for Danish and 
German households, to 40 years for Spanish and Italian households, with this average 
being similar in the two sub-samples. Regarding educational attainment, we can observe 
in all five countries that, in general, mothers show greater percentages at the primary 
level of education than fathers and, further, that fathers exhibit either the same or 
greater percentages than mothers at the higher education level. If we now compare 
countries, we find that Spain stands out because of its high percentage of individuals 
with primary education, more than 60%, with Denmark and Germany at the opposite 
extreme, with less than 20%. Additionally, for all five countries, we can observe a 
greater percentage of individuals with only primary education in those families in which 
only the father works, and a greater percentage of individuals with higher education in 
those families where both parents work. These differences are more evident in the case 
of mothers. This allows us to establish that first, the level of education when only the 
father works is lower than when both father and mother work and, second, differences 
across subsamples are much more significant in the case of mothers, with these facts 
underlining the importance of considering the participation status of mothers. 
With respect to the three variables referring to the presence of children in the family, 
Children<16, Children<12 and Birth, we can observe that the number of children under 
age 16 is in all cases above 1.55, reaching 1.80 in France and Denmark. These figures 
agree with those presented for other countries by de Laat and Sevilla-Sanz (2006). We 
can also note that, in general, this number is higher in families where only the father 
works. In regards to the presence of children under age 12, we can see that, in almost 
  1190% of families with children, there is a child younger than 12, with few differences 
across countries and across subsamples. Similarly, the percentage of families with a 
birth in the corresponding year is very similar in all countries, about 7%, with this 
figure being somewhat higher in Denmark, 10%. 
The next variable to be considered is FamilyIncome, measured as the family’s non-
labor income in thousands of real euros per year, in purchasing power parity. First, we 
can identify small differences in mean values between the five sample countries, the 
highest value being observed in Denmark, which is double the lowest value, observed in 
Spain. Second, non-labor earnings in Italy, Spain and France are clearly higher in 
families in which both parents work, than in those in which only the father works; they 
are almost the same in Denmark, and slightly lower in Germany. One could argue from 
these values that public transfers, an important part of non-labor income, are in 
Southern countries mainly allocated only to workers, as opposed to Central and Nordic 
countries, in which mothers do not need to be workers in order to receive public 
benefits (see Trifiletti 1999). This is partially supported by the evidence offered by the 
variable Ratio, defined as the proportion of the mother’s non-labor income over the 
family’s non-labor income. When only the father works, this figure is much higher in 
Denmark, over 40%, around 15% in Central countries, and less than 11% in the 
Mediterranean countries. When both parents work, Denmark again shows the highest 
fraction, over 70%, with values between 25% and 40% in the other sample countries. In 
the whole sample, values are qualitatively similar to these latter. 
Finally, we have also included those variables which refer to the hours dedicated to 
working outside the home. Note that the average number of hours worked by fathers 
does not greatly vary, whether both parents work or only the father does. The most 
hours worked per week by fathers appears in Spain, 46, while the fewest are in France 
and Germany, 40. With respect to mothers, greater differences across countries can be 
observed. Beginning with the fact that the proportion of parents in the samples who 
both work varies from only 31% in Spain and 42% in Italy, to slightly over 50% in 
Germany and France, and up to 81% in Denmark; the number of hours per week worked 
by mothers increases as we move North. Thus, in Spain the average is less than 14 
hours, around 15 in Italy, 17 in Germany, almost 20 in France and almost 30 in 
Denmark. However, when both parents work, the highest values are found in the 
Mediterranean countries, and in Denmark, with values around 35 hours per week. In the 
  12Central countries, these values are closer to 30 hours. The explanation seems clear. 
Fewer mothers work in the Mediterranean countries, but when they do, they work 
almost as many hours as fathers. This evidence has also been found by Trifiletti (1999), 
which allows her to claim the distinct characterization of the Mediterranean or Latin rim 
of welfare states, compared to the conservative Central European countries. Thus, it is 
confirmed that benefits for mothers are only available if they are workers. When adding 
the time spent on childcare to the time spent on paid work, the highest figures are 
observed in Denmark for all three subsamples. This is clearly higher than in the other 
sample countries which, in general, exhibit figures quite similar among themselves. 
Another noteworthy result is that, when both parents work, the total amount of time 
spent on both activities is greater for mothers than for fathers, with differences ranging 
from 5 hours in Denmark to almost 14 hours in France. 
A first assessment of gender differences in the number of hours dedicated to 
childcare can be obtained from two indicators proposed by Lawrence Haddad and Ravi 
Kanbur (1990). These indices, commonly known as HK and IR, provide an inequality 
measure from the individual values indicated for each of the parents. In particular, HK 
is the ratio between the difference of the two values for both parents and their sum, 
whilst IR is computed as the ratio between the lowest and the highest values for each of 
the variables. In Table 2 we present the values of both indicators, with these being 
calculated for the total number of families, as well as for those in which both parents 
work, and for those in which only the father works. Both inequality measures oscillate 
between 0 and 1, with HK indicating the maximum equality when it is 0, and the 
maximum inequality when it is 1, and IR being interpreted in the opposite way. Given 
that the interpretation of the two indices is analogous, we focus here on describing the 
results derived from the first indicator, HK. Considering first the total number of 
families, a significant difference can be seen between Denmark and the rest of the 
sample countries. In these latter, inequality in caring for children ranges between 0.65 in 
Germany to 0.76 in Spain, against 0.39 in Denmark. We also note that this inequality is 
higher in all cases when only the father works, with significant differences across 
countries, than in the case when both parents work outside the home, where the HK 
values are more similar across countries.  
(Table 2) 
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In this section we first present the estimation strategy followed and we then interpret the 
results of the estimation of the hours dedicated by each of the parents to caring for 
children. The dependent variable is regressed against the aforementioned explanatory 
variables, as expressed in the following specification:  
A AA A A A A A
it 1 it 2 it 1 it 2 it i it hR a t i o I n c o m e z z µβ β α =+ + + + ++ δδ
A e
B
    i =1, …, N; t =1, …, T   
BBB B B B B B
it 1 it 2 it 1 it 2 it i it h Ratio Income z z e µβ β α =+ + + + ++ δδ     i =1, …, N; t =1, …, T  
where 
A
it h  and   are the number of hours that each parent (A and B) dedicates to 
childcare, Ratio is the ratio of mother’s non-labor income to that of the family, Income 
is the family non-labour income, and z includes individual characteristics for each 
spouse and other family characteristics. The parameters β and δ are the coefficients 
accompanying the variables; µ and α are constant terms, with µ being  the average 
population and α the individual deviation with respect to this average; and, finally, e are 





We must first note that a number of considerations have shaped our estimation strategy. 
The first is that childcare is, obviously, considered to be a task with characteristics 
different from paid work, leisure and housework and, hence, it is worthy of study 
separately from other uses of time (Suzanne Bianchi 2000; Bianchi and Raley 2005; 
Howie et al. 2006).
8
Second, our proposed estimation methodology is close in spirit to the papers by 
Hallberg and Klevmarken (2003), Kalenkoski, Ribar, and Stratton (2005, 2007) and has 
been previously applied, among others, by Inmaculada Garcia, José Alberto Molina, 
and Victor Montuenga (2009) in studying the allocation of time devoted to paid work. It 
is developed in a reduced form and, since error terms are correlated within the 
household, both father’s and mother’s equations are simultaneously estimated in order 
to gain efficiency.
9 Given the absence of information in the data base about the hours 
devoted to other tasks (e.g., housework and leisure) a global treatment of all decisions 
in a unified framework is not possible. Furthermore, the fact that we are using panel 
  14data methods to control for unobservable heterogeneity, for each couple observed over 
several years, allows us to obtain more robust estimates when dealing with simultaneity.  
Third, since hours spent in leisure and housework by each of the parents are omitted 
from the analysis, but it is reasonable to think that the decision on the hours devoted to 
childcare depends on, and influences, the hours devoted to paid work, then an 
endogeneity problem is likely to arise. In order to take into account such endogeneity, 
we may instrument it with a variable highly correlated with time in employment, and 
very likely exogenous, at least at the individual level, to the number of hours devoted to 
childcare.
10 After some exploratory exercises, one possible instrument is the average 
number of hours worked by the total of workers employed in the same occupation as the 
individual, in each year and in each country, and of the same gender. As stated above, 
the variables Ratio and FamilyIncome are computed, in all estimates, as the ratio of 
mother’s non-labor income to that of the family, and as the family non-labour income, 
respectively. In this way, we avoid the induced endogeneity that these variables would 
have had if we had considered total family income and total mother’s income, since in 
these cases labor income depends on the number of hours worked, which is clearly 
endogenous.
11 
Fourth, in regards to the specification, we adopt an efficient theoretical approach 
which captures features from both unitary and collective models. Thus, FamilyIncome is 
a representative variable in both models, whereas variables representing bargaining 
power (Ratio or Education, for example), are specific to the collective model (Kim and 
Zepeda, 2004). 
Fifth, since we are considering couples with children, it is possible that some of the 
parents, perhaps both, could be unemployed, or simply non-participants. Consequently, 
the problem of selection into employment may be of great importance in our study. The 
difficulty is that, taking all the dimensions of our study into account, the selection 
problem is quite intractable, because we are considering both simultaneity in the 
parents’ decisions, and endogeneity in the time of paid work, within a panel data 
framework. If, additionally, we consider the problem of selectivity, our task would be 
quite overwhelming, especially knowing that a clear treatment of selectivity issues with 
panel data is not straightforward. Thus, although some techniques have been suggested 
(Jeffrey Wooldridge, 1995, 2002; Ekaterina Kyriazidou, 1997, 2001), no clear-cut 
conclusions have been reached about the appropriateness of each (see Christian 
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(see Anastasia Semykina and Jeffrey Wooldridge, 2008). Bearing this in mind, but still 
with the aim of considering a possible different behavior between two-earner couples, 
and those with only male earners (there is a very low number of sample couples where 
the only earner is the mother), we have decided to estimate two separate samples: one 
sample for those couples where both parents work outside the home, and the other for 
couples where only the father works. Although we do not explicitly take into account 
the issue of sample selection and, in consequence, we express our cautions against the 
potential biases, the estimation of two separate samples is an approximation to compare 
results and to shed some light on the distinct behavior between the differing 
participation status of mothers. 
Sixth, although the family structure may, in principle, have some influence on the 
time spent on childcare, through the availability of more resources, generation of new 
necessities, the possibility of specialization, the raising of collaboration or conflicts 
within the household, previous evidence shows negligible differences between types of 
couples  (see Kalenkoski, Ribar, and Stratton 2007). This, along with our aim of 
analyzing intra-household allocation of time, leads us to consider only those families 
with two parents, either married or cohabitant.  
Seventh, the five sample countries cover an ample range of the variations observed 
within Europe. As discussed above, they are thought to capture heterogeneity in welfare 
state regime types, across Northern, Central and Southern countries. However, not only 
can differences across countries be explained by different welfare state regimes, but 
gender norms and stereotypes also play a role in the performance of childcare and its 
determinants. Thus, Kim and Zepeda (2004) argue that social norms, for example, wage 
discrimination against women, weaken mothers’ bargaining power. Almudena Sevilla-
Sanz (2007) shows that less egalitarian social norms favor specialization within the 
family, whereas de Laat and Sevilla-Sanz (2006) extend this argument to analyze their 
influence on fertility and female participation rates (see also Raquel Fernandez, 
Alessandra Fogli, and Claudia Olivetti 2004). The five countries considered in this 
paper also show great differences regarding social norms, being more egalitarian in the 
Nordic, less so in the Mediterranean, and in an intermediate position in the Central 
countries.  
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Bearing in mind the aim of our study, focused on the differences across countries in 
regards to  the behavior of fathers and mothers in caring for children, and on the 
influence of the determinants under consideration, the estimation procedure is 
structured as follows. First, we estimate each equation corresponding to the hours 
dedicated by each parent, using aggregated data by OLS. We then use the panel data 
structure to estimate the equations, considering individual effects, both fixed and 
random. The LM test shows the preference of the panel estimation over the pool 
estimation, while the Hausman test reveals that the fixed effects model is the 
appropriate estimation procedure in all cases.
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A first approximation of the final results are obtained from an OLS estimation, with 
the results being presented in Table 3. Here, simultaneity is accounted for, but 
unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity are not. However, our estimation provides 
some exploratory results for the whole set of regressors and, particularly, for those 
related to educational levels and the average age. These latter variables are time-
invariant, or their time-differentials are constant over time, so that they disappear when 
mean-differences are taken in estimating by fixed effects. In very general terms, we can 
see that time spent on childcare increases with the number of children in the household, 
especially in the case of mothers, and more especially when the children are infants. 
Moreover, there seems to be an opposite behaviour between fathers and mothers, in 
regard to the influence of hours of paid work on the hours of childcare. The influence of 
all these variables will be discussed more thoroughly below, after estimating by fixed 
effects, and after controlling for the endogeneity of hours of paid work. 
Focusing now on the other variables, we can observe that, on average, the older a 
couple is, the less time is spent on childcare. One simple interpretation is that, since, by 
construction, all sample couples have at least one dependent child, and statistics show 
that almost 90% of the sample has a child younger than 12, the negative influence of 
this variable can be interpreted, not as being a cohort effect, but as that childcare is less 
intensive in, on average, older couples, probably because children in these couples, 
although under age 12, are, on average, older  than those of the younger couples. 
However, another interpretation seems also sound. Younger couples, that is to say, 
couples of more recent cohorts, are more willing, caeteris paribus, to spend more time 
on childcare, supporting the view that childcare now incorporates an important 
  17investment component. This corroborates previous findings in the literature (see, e.g., 
Bianchi 2000). By gender, the common result is that the negative effect is greater in 
mothers than in fathers, except in Denmark. 
Educational levels have a distinct impact across countries and across genders. In 
Denmark, a greater education level of mothers leads to more hours spent on childcare 
by both parents. Similar results, even though weaker, are found for the other sample 
countries. An exception is Germany, where more educated mothers only implies more 
time on childcare for fathers whose partners do not work in the market. For their part, 
the more educated the fathers, the more time both parents spend on childcare, in both 
subsamples in Spain, and only when the father works in Italy and Denmark. In France, 
more educated fathers result in less time being spent by both parents on childcare, 
whereas in Germany there are no significant effects. 
This appears to suggest that, overall, greater educational levels, which can be 
considered to approximate wages, lead to more time being spent with children in four of 
the sample countries. Estimates for France are not so clear, since higher educational 
attainments of fathers implies less time spent on childcare by both parents, whereas 
university-graduate mothers spend more time with their children. In general, we can 
conclude that the more educated mothers are, the more time they spend on childcare in 
almost all cases, whereas more educated fathers spend more hours on childcare only in 
the Southern countries and in Denmark.  Expressed in other terms, if we interpret 
educational levels as an approximation of wages, coefficients in Table 3 are usually 
found to be statistically significantly positive, except in the case of France and 
Germany. Specifically, in Italy, Spain and Denmark, higher mothers’ own wages leads 
to more hours spent on childcare by fathers and mothers, whereas higher fathers’ own 
wages mainly implies more hours on childcare by them, but fewer hours by the mothers. 
In these results, these countries resemble more the case of the US (Kimmel and 
Connelly, 2007; Connelly and Kimmel, 2007) than that of other European countries 
(Hallberg and Klevmarken, 2003, for Sweden; and Kalenkoski, Ribar, and Stratton, 
2009, for the UK).  
(Table 3) 
Although OLS estimates provide a first glance of the determinants of childcare, they 
suffer from some econometric problems. Since the same couples are followed by the 
survey over several periods, unobserved heterogeneity can be controlled for by using 
  18panel data estimation techniques. A simple LM test (see the second last row in Table 4) 
shows that the consideration of individual effects is strongly preferred to the pooled 
estimation.  Furthermore, since those unobserved individual effects are likely to be 
correlated with the regressors, a fixed effects model must be applied. Thus, for example, 
the family’s willingness to have children may be correlated with the number of 
children; the desire to have better educated children may also be correlated with 
parents’ education, and so on. Nevertheless, and with the aim of checking the possible 
correlation between individual effects and observed regressors, we have applied 
Hausman tests, which confirm the appropriateness of the fixed effects estimation, rather 
than the random effects, in all five country samples (see last row in Table 4). 
After selecting the best specification,  we now describe the estimation of the 
parameters presented in Table 4. In this case, not only have fixed effects estimations 
been applied, but the simultaneity in the decision-making process between the two 
parents has also been taken into account. As stated, estimations for fathers and mothers 
are carried out in a single equation, allowing for different parameters for each of the 
parents, including the intercepts. The results are now discussed in turn. 
(Table 4) 
The variable expressing the relative bargaining power of women, Ratio, has a 
negative impact on the time spent by mothers on childcare, in all sample countries, but 
is only significant in the subsamples in which mothers do not work outside the home, 
while in Germany and Italy, it is also significant in the subsamples in which both 
parents work. Additionally, such a reduction of the number of hours of childcare by 
mothers is accompanied by an increase in the number of hours fathers spend with their 
children, even though the influence is only significant in Germany, and marginally so in 
Denmark and Italy. This suggests that a higher bargaining power of women helps them 
to reduce time spent on childcare, but only achieves an increase of time devoted by 
fathers to this activity in Germany.
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In regard to the FamilyIncome variable, differences across countries are evident. 
Whereas a higher family, non-labor, income positively and significantly influences the 
number of hours spent on childcare by both parents in France, the opposite result is 
found for Germany. In Denmark, it reduces the time that mothers who do not work in 
the market spend with their children, whereas in Italy it increases the time that fathers 
whose wives do not work outside the home devote to childcare. In Spain, the results 
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of France  can be interpreted as the parents’ preference for childcare provided by 
themselves, compared to hiring such services in the market, whereas the opposite 
applies in Germany.  Thus, it can be interpreted that the investment component of 
childcare in France is more relevant than in the other sample countries. By contrast, in 
Germany our results suggest that parents may prefer to devote extra income to hire 
childcare in the market.
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With respect to the child variables, almost all coefficients are estimated to be 
positively significant, with the only exception being the coefficients of variable 
Children<16 in Germany, which are found to be negative. Two general results can be 
observed: that coefficients for mothers are always greater than those of fathers; and that 
coefficients corresponding to the Birth variable are the highest. However, some results 
differ from these general rules, and we now describe them for each individual variable. 
First, a newborn child in the family leads to more hours spent on childcare by both 
parents, in all sample countries. However, coefficients for mothers are considerably 
higher, between five and ten times those of fathers. Moreover, whereas for mothers such 
coefficients are higher than those corresponding to variable Children<12, except in 
Denmark, they are clearly lower in the case of fathers, with this being the general rule, 
although there are certain exceptions. Hence, we can deduce that a new birth in the 
family necessitates an increases in the time devoted to childcare by mothers, much more 
than in the case of fathers, and much more than when the child is not an infant. As 
children grow older, the impact on time devoted to children is more evenly distributed 
across genders, so that the influence on fathers is quantitatively greater than in the case 
of a new birth. In the case of Danish fathers, this latter coefficient is non-significant 
even when both parents work. 
Across subsamples, a Birth in the family leads to more time on childcare by mothers, 
with few variations, whether the mother works or not, whereas the impact on fathers is 
higher when both parents work, as against the case in which only the father works, 
except in Denmark. These results are, in general, common to both variables, Birth and 
Children<12. Taking together the estimates for these two variables, it is apparent that 
the presence of infants greatly influences time spent on childcare in all countries, with 
this influence continuing as the children grow older, though in a more moderate way. 
The only exception is, again, Denmark, where coefficients of variables Children<12 are 
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explained by the benefits and leave arrangements in this latter country, compared to the 
other countries. In Denmark, in the first years of a child, parental leave is extensive and 
generous, with facilities for childcare from the moment the father or mother returns to 
work. However, as described in Bettio and Plantenga (2004), the financial benefits in 
the other sample countries are not as great, and public care facilities are reduced on 
return to work. 
The variable indicating the number of children under age 16 shows similar results, 
even though estimated coefficients are somewhat smaller. The most striking result is 
that estimates for Germany are negative, but they are only significant when mothers do 
not work outside home. The relevance of this variable suggests that, not only the 
presence and the age of children have an impact on time devoted to childcare, but also 
the number of children. It is worth noting that the greatest effect of the number of 
children on time spent on childcare is observed in Denmark. The more extended 
coverage of public services and childcare arrangements may explain this result. In 
summary, the presence of children augments the number of hours spent on childcare, 
especially in the case of mothers, and when children are infants. In Denmark, and to a 
lesser extent in Germany, this effect is also observed for fathers, particularly when both 
parents work.  
In regard to the influence of time allocated to paid work on time spent on childcare, 
one general result emerges. More hours worked by fathers/mothers imply fewer hours 
devoted by them to childcare, and more hours devoted by their corresponding spouses. 
That is, more hours in paid work by fathers leads to fewer hours in childcare by them, 
and more by mothers. Conversely, more hours in paid work by mothers generates more 
time in childcare by fathers and less by mothers. The statistical significance of this 
general result declines, when compared to the OLS estimates, and decreases further 
when endogeneity is instrumented (see Table A2 in the Appendix).
15 From the estimates 
appearing in Table 4, several comments arise. First, more coefficients are estimated to 
be significant in the sub-sample in which both parents work. Second, more hours 
worked by mothers result in significant reductions in the time spent on childcare by 
mothers, in all sample countries, whereas statistically significant increases in childcare 
by fathers are only observed in France and Germany. Third, more hours worked by 
fathers in Denmark and Italy reduce significantly the time spent in childcare by fathers, 
  21and simultaneously increases significantly the time spent in childcare by mothers. In the 
other sample countries, the influence is almost insignificant. Finally, in Spain, most of 
the coefficients are found to be insignificant. This latter result suggests that, in Spain, 
the time spent on childcare is quite inelastic to changes in the hours of paid work, which 
is in line with the observations from a number of EU countries in Bianchi (2000); 
Hallberg and Klevmarken (2003); Sayer, Bianchi, and Robinson (2004); Bianchi and 
Raley (2005); Sandberg and Hoffart (2005). 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this paper has been to analyse gender differences in the allocation of 
time spent caring for children. To that end, we have considered the efficiency approach 
to derive demand functions for hours spent on childcare, and estimated these for five 
national samples, namely Danish, French, German, Italian and Spanish households, 
drawn from the eight waves of the European Community Household Panel-ECHP 
(1994-2001). 
Before carrying out the econometric analysis, we have first provided a body of 
descriptive evidence which clearly points to the specialization of mothers in caring for 
children in the sample countries, even though differences exist among them. Thus, the 
average number of hours mothers dedicate to caring for children ranges from five times 
more than men in Mediterranean countries, e.g. Spain, to less than two times more than 
men in Denmark, as an example of the Nordic countries. The HK and IR indicators 
confirm this evidence, showing that the greatest inequality in caring for children 
appears in Spain, and the smallest in Denmark.  
In regards to the estimation strategy, the following aspects have been considered. 
First, time devoted to childcare deserves to be studied separately from other uses of 
time, such as labour supply or housework. Second, the fact that decisions made in 
allocating time to childcare depend on, and influence, other time uses, leads us to 
conclude that endogeneity must be addressed in the analysis of the decision-making 
process. Third, in modelling intra-household allocation of time, we consider that 
families consist of two adult members, the parents, each with their own preferences, and 
that final decisions are taken simultaneously. In this respect, we adopt a general 
theoretical approach, namely the efficiency approach, which encompasses both unitary 
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decisions about time spent on childcare are modelled in a reduced form, specified by 
demand functions, which are seen as being influenced by a series of economic 
determinants, i.e. individual and household characteristics, as well as variables related 
to bargaining power. Fifth, taking into account that such determinants can vary across 
welfare state regime types, and social norms and stereotypes, we have carried out the 
analysis for several EU countries considered to be representative within the EU. Sixth, 
the database used, the eight waves of the ECHP, from 1994 to 2001, is common for the 
five sample countries, such that information obtained can be considered to be 
homogeneous. The fact that the data are provided in panel form has allowed us to 
control for unobserved individual heterogeneity. Finally, selectivity issues have been 
partially addressed by analyzing the behavior of those families where both parents 
work, separately from those where only the father works. Taken together, the 
simultaneous consideration of all these factors constitutes an important contribution to 
the existing international literature on the allocation of childcare between parents. 
Our fixed effects estimations yield the following relevant results. First, a higher level 
of mothers’ non-labor income, compared to family’s non-labor income, implies fewer 
hours spent on childcare by mothers and more time spent on childcare by fathers. 
Second, FamilyIncome positively influences the number of hours spent on childcare by 
both parents, in most of the sample countries. This suggests that childcare represents an 
important investment component, at least in some countries. Third, education variables, 
which can be interpreted as approximating wages, show differing behaviors across 
countries, across genders and, less importantly, across subsamples. Fourth, a very robust 
result across countries is that the presence of young children, especially infants, 
increases the time spent on childcare by fathers, and more so by mothers. Furthermore, 
as children grow older, that influence is reduced in importance, but only disappears 
completely in Germany, for children under sixteen. Fifth, the impact of the number of 
hours worked on the number of hours spent on childcare differs greatly across genders. 
More hours on paid work by one of the parents implies more hours on childcare by the 
corresponding spouse, and fewer hours by the former. These results, however, appear to 
be significant only in the samples in which both parents work. If instruments are used, 
robust results are only found to be significant in Germany, suggesting that, in the 
remaining countries, changes in the number of hours worked are absorbed mainly 
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These results reveal that the case of Denmark is quite different from that of the other 
countries studied. This is probably due to the social democratic policies characteristic of 
the Nordic countries, policies that seek to enhance women’s participation in paid work, 
through two channels. The first is greater flexibility in the workplace, i.e. flexible time 
schedules that allow for childcare during working time, and the establishment and 
growth of kindergartens at the workplace with adjustable timetables, thus making 
family and work tasks more compatible. The second is greater security at the workplace, 
with extensive care arrangements and the aim of equal pay for men and women. These 
policies have permitted significant growth in equality for women in the workplace in 
general in Denmark, and also in childcare for those working women who are mothers. 
In the remaining countries studied, despite the fact that time spent on childcare is now 
less gender-specific than in the past, the difference with respect to Denmark and the 
Nordic countries in general is still significant (see also Bettio and Plantenga, 2004). 
Thus, women’s participation in the labor market in Mediterranean countries, despite the 
gains of recent years, is still about 20 points below that of the Nordic countries. Our 
data show that both parents work in only 31% of Spanish families, 42% in Italy, 
compared to 80% in Denmark. At the same time, it appears that increasing the 
prevalence of women in part-time jobs, which is characteristic of the Central 
conservative countries, such as Germany or France, does not result in a more balanced 
sharing of the caring tasks. 
Therefore, and taking the Danish case as a benchmark, although promoting women’s 
participation in the labor market helps to reduce inequality between fathers and mothers 
(see Barbara Bergmann, 2001), such participation should be accompanied by both 
economic measures (such as modifications in taxation, benefits, allowances, divorce and 
parenting legislation) and changes in social norms (egalitarian attitudes toward 
employment, housework and childcare), with the aim of increasing equality in 
housework tasks, including childcare (Alvarez and Miles 2003; de Laat and Sevilla 
2006; Seguino 2007).  
 
NOTES 
1 Mark Aguiar and Erik Hurst (2007) use alternative measures of leisure to find a 
  24different behavior in the US across educational groups, which result in an aggregate 
increase of leisure time for both men and women over time.
2 This result is also found for the US by Kalenkoski, Ribar, and Stratton (2007) and for 
Switzerland by Alfonso Souza-Poza, Hans Schmid, and Rolf Widmer (2001). However, 
Korenman, Liao, and O’Neill (2005) do not find influence of own wages on time 
devoted to childcare in the US.
 
3 Consequently, we cannot develop a full structural model containing all possible uses 
of time, as exists in other studies which use Time Use Surveys (Korenman, Liao, and 
O’Neill 2005; Kimmel and Connelly 2007; Connelly and Kimmel 2007; Kato and 
Matsumoto 2008). 
4 Finland is also included in the ECHP, but only since 1996. Sweden has not been 
considered in our study, since information about hours devoted to childcare is not 
available. Although the case of the UK has also been excluded, previous evidence for 
this country exists (e.g. Kalenkoski, Ribar, and Stratton 2005). 
5 For more information on this data base, see Bettio and Plantenga (2004).  
6 See Bernard Fortin and Guy Lacroix (1997); Pierre-Andre Chiappori, Bernard Fortin 
and Guy Lacroix (2002); Bittman et al. (2003); Leora Friedberg and Anthony Webb 
(2006) among many others. One measure seldom used is the difference in age between 
husband and wife (see Michael Myck et al. 2006), with this being insignificant in our 
study. We thank one anonymous referee for calling our attention to this point in a 
previous version. 
7 Adults in the survey are considered those individuals 16 years or older. There is no 
other information about the number of children by age groups (under age  6, etc.). 
8 As shown in the studies for the US by Connelly and Kimmel (2007) and Kimmel and 
Connelly (2007), childcare exhibits a behavior quite close to that of paid work, in the 
sense that first, the number of hours devoted to each activity have increased over time 
(especially in women), and second, time devoted to paid work and childcare reacts 
positively to changes in wages. 
9 See also Chris Van Klaveren, Bernard Van Praag, and Henriette Van der Brink (2006) 
and Martin Browning and Metter Gortz (2006).  
10 Alvarez and Miles (2003) opted to eliminate the time spent in paid work from the 
analysis, to avoid endogeneity in the estimation of the determinants of time spent in 
housework. We would prefer to deal with such endogeneity by applying instruments. 
  2511 We thank anonymous referees for their suggestions regarding the treatment of 
endogeneity. 
12 Despite problems of endogeneity being somewhat intractable to a simple resolution, 
our data allows us to instrument variables, with the results, presented in Table A2 in the 
Appendix, not varying substantially from those obtained without the instrumented 
variables. 
13 By contrast, Connelly and Kimmel (2007) find that a higher value of the ratio 
increases the share of childcare by mothers in the US. 
14 With respect to evidence in other EU countries not included in this paper, Kalenkoski, 
Ribar, and Stratton (2005), for the UK, using an exogenous indicator variable for the 
receipt of non-labor income, find no influence of family income on childcare.  
15 Note that OLS estimates are generally found to be significant. A remarkable result is 
that more hours worked by mothers implies less time in childcare by them, which is 
significant in all countries when endogeneity is not instrumented, this result is observed 
only in Germany when endogeneity is dealt with.  
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Table 1 Averages and standard deviations of the variables 





































Dependent                  
ChildCareFather
 
                                 
                             
                               
                             
e n t                  
                               
                               
                                 
                             
                               
                             
                               
                             
                               
                             
                               
                             
                               
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                               
                             
                               
                             
                                 
                             
                               
                             
                             
                             
                               
19.38 19.11 18.15 9.45 11.20 6.76 9.63 15.48 7.38 7.97 10.10 5.78 7.45 11.10 4.81
(23.79) (23.65) (22.40) (12.63) (13.19) (10.10) (9.64) (9.47) (8.17) (12.37) (13.60) (10.01) (15.09) (17.39) (11.54)
ChildCareMother
 
32.91 31.44 41.85 37.63 31.43 39.95 30.08 38.19 42.71 30.14 27.91 32.89 36.45 30.73 41.57
(31.62) (30.83) (34.82) (28.33) (24.22) (32.98) (22.39) (19.22) (25.99) (24.15) (21.41) (26.31) (32.42) (27.09) (34.59)
I n d e p e n d
AverageAge
 
38.21 38.60 36.34 38.68 38.59 38.36 38.29 38.06 37.92 39.88 39.55 39.30 39.78 39.06 39.37
(6.13) (5.90) 0.65 0.74 0.17 0.57 0.78 0.15 0.57 0.72 0.10 0.58 0.73 0.07 0.48 0.60
PrimaryFather
 
0.15 0.13 (2.68) (2.92) (1.08) (0.86) (0.83) (0.38) (1.73) (1.35) (0.25) (17.69) (6.56) (0.71) (5.69) (5.76) (
(0.36) (0.34) (0.39) (0.49) (0.47) (0.50) (0.40) (0.31) (0.39) (0.50) (0.48) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.48)
SecondaryFather
 
0.47 0.46 0.52 0.34 0.37 0.31 0.56 0.57 0.54 0.37 0.45 0.34 0.18 0.21 0.18
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.47) (0.48) (0.46) (0.37) (0.49) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (0.47) (0.39) (0.40) (0.39)
UniversityFather
 
0.38 0.41 0.29 0.24 0.26 0.23 0.28 0.31 0.26 0.11 0.17 0.07 0.22 0.36 0.18
(0.49) (0.49) (0.45) (0.43) (0.44) (0.42) (0.50) (0.46) (0.44) (0.31) (0.38) (0.26) (0.42) (0.48) (0.38)
PrimaryMother
 
0.16 0.12 0.27 0.40 0.32 0.49 0.21 0.14 0.25 0.50 0.32 0.63 0.63 0.39 0.72
(0.36) (0.32) (0.44) (0.49) (0.47) (0.50) (0.41) (0.35) (0.44) (0.50) (0.47) (0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.45)
SecondaryMother
 
0.44 0.44 0.50 0.31 0.33 0.29 0.59 0.58 0.62 0.40 0.51 0.32 0.18 0.21 0.18
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.46) (0.47) (0.45) (0.77) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.47) (0.38) (0.40) (0.38)
UniversityMother
 
0.40 0.44 0.23 0.27 0.33 0.18 0.18 0.27 0.11 0.09 0.17 0.04 0.20 0.40 0.11
(0.49) (0.50) (0.42) (0.44) (0.47) (0.38) (0.38) (0.44) (0.32) (0.29) (0.37) (0.20) (0.40) (0.49) (0.31)
Ratio  0.64 0.71 0.42 0.21 0.25 0.17 0.28 0.37 0.14 0.24 0.39 0.11 0.15 0.25 0.08
  (0.41) (0.37) (0.45) (0.35) (0.36) (0.33) (0.42) (0.44) (0.32) (0.38) (0.41) (0.29) (0.33) (0.40) (0.25)
FamilyIncome  2.09 2.08 2.09 1.60 1.78 1.44 1.35 1.28 1.39 1.73 2.31 1.42 1.02 1.23 0.94
  (0.42) (0.37) (0.48) (0.31) (0.28) (0.33) (0.94) (0.92) (0.95) (0.64) (0.78) (0.56) (0.57) (0.34) (0.64)
Birth
 
0.10 0.09 0.17 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06
(0.30) (0.29) (0.37) (0.26) (0.25) (0.28) (0.25) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.24) (0.26) (0.24)
Children<16
 
1.82 1.80 1.88 1.83 1.67 2.08 1.68 1.50 1.90 1.55 1.49 1.61 1.62 1.56 1.64
(0.82) (0.79) (0.84) (0.89) (0.72) (1.02) (0.81) (0.67) (0.92) (0.70) (0.64) (0.74) (0.72) (0.66) (0.71)
Children<12
 
0.89 0.88 0.92 0.87 0.85 0.89 0.84 0.80 0.89 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.86 0.87 0.86
(0.32) (0.33) (0.27) (0.34) (0.35) (0.31) (0.37) (0.40) (0.32) (0.37) (0.37) (0.36) (0.35) (0.33) (0.35)
WorkedFather
 
42.50 42.61 42.36 39.42 39.21 42.05 40.26 45.35 40.25 42.44 42.34 42.55 46.03 45.83 46.26
(15.00) (10.86) (12.58) (19.00) (15.95) (16.64) (17.21) (11.90) (10.59) (16.07) (11.02) (10.86) (19.19) (12.30) (11.99)
  WorkedMother
 
29.16 35.18 0.00 19.95 32.27 0.00 17.04 29.35 0.00 15.65 33.85 0.00 13.82 37.97 0.00
(15.59) (9.10) (0.00) (19.04) (13.67) (0.00) (18.26) (15.71) (0.00) (18.50) (11.24) (0.00) (19.61) (11.73) (0.00)
Observations 4581 3859 722 11682 7346 4336 10436 6327 5109 14129 6657 7472 11430 4153 7277 
 
Table 2 Inequality measures 





































HK  0.39                              0.37 0.51 0.70 0.60 0.84 0.65 0.55 0.74 0.69 0.59 0.79 0.76 0.61 0.85
  (0.34)                             
                               
                             
(0.34) (0.33) (0.35) (0.37) (0.25) (0.31) (0.32) (0.32) (0.34) (0.36) (0.28) (0.33) (0.39) (0.26)
IR 0.52 0.55 0.40 0.24 0.32 0.12 0.30 0.36 0.20 0.24 0.33 0.15 0.19 0.33 0.11
  (0.35) (0.35) (0.32) (0.31) (0.34) (0.21) (0.29) (0.31) (0.24) (0.29) (0.32) (0.22) (0.29) (0.36) (0.21)
Note. Standard deviations in brackets 
 
 
  25Table 3 OLS estimation 
  Denmark  France        Germany Italy Spain
  Both work   Only the father 
works   Both work   Only the father 
works   Both work   Only the father 
works   Both work   Only the father 
works   Both work   Only the father 
works  
Variables Fathers  Mothers  Fathers  Mothers Fathers Mothers Fathers Mothers Fathers  Mother



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































      




(0.02)   (0.01) 





2 0.31 0.33 0.29 0.33 0.12 0.10 0.31 0.10 0.44 0.43
Notes. Standard deviations in brackets. *:the coefficient is significant at 10%. **:the coefficient is significant at 5%. 
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Table 4. Fixed effects estimation 
  Denmark  France        Germany Italy Spain
  Both work   Only the father 
works   Both work   Only the father 
works   Both work   Only the father 
works   Both work   Only the father 
works   Both work   Only the father 
works  

























































































































































































































































































WorkedMother  0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.13** 

























































Notes. Standard deviations in brackets (p-values in the tests). *:the coefficient is significant at 10%. **:the coefficient is significant at 5%. 






  27APPENDIX  
 
Table A1. Number of observations per wave 
 





































                 
1994                               
                               
                               
                               
                               
                               
                               
                               
                               
724 610 114 1645 1034 611 1487 902 728 2554 1203 1351 1658 602 1056
1995 654 551 103 1605 1009 596 1425 864 698 2148 1012 1136 1605 583 1022
1996 625 526 99 1521 956 565 1341 813 656 1845 869 976 1525 554 971
1997 570 480 90 1465 921 544 1320 800 646 1618 762 856 1415 514 901
1998 556 468 88 1425 896 529 1281 777 627 1581 745 836 1358 493 865
1999 510 430 80 1385 871 514 1262 765 618 1507 710 797 1325 481 844
2000 505 425 80 1331 837 494 1207 732 591 1455 686 769 1285 467 818
2001 437 368 69 1305 821 484 1113 675 545 1421 670 751 1259 457 802
Total 4581 3859 722 11682 7346 4336 10436 6327 5109 14129 6657 7472 11430 4153 7277
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Table A2. Fixed effects estimation (instrumental variables) 
  Denmark  France        Germany Italy Spain
  Both work   Only the father 
works   Both work   Only the father 
works   Both work   Only the father 
works   Both work   Only the father 
works   Both work   Only the father 
works  

























































































































































































































































































WorkedMother  0.26 
(0.24) 
-0.22 
(0.32)            
0.16 















Notes. Standard errors in brackets. *:the coefficient is significant at 10%. **:the coefficient is significant at 5%. 
WorkedFather and Worked Mother are both instrumented by their respective average hours worked, by each occupation, by gender and by year. 
ChildCareFather and ChildCareMother are estimated simultaneously in a single equation 
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